America points to its free enterprise system as a model for other nations. The
country's economic success seems to validate the view that the economy operates
best when government leaves businesses and individuals to succeed -- or fail --
on their own merits in open, competitive markets. But exactly how "free" is
business in America's free enterprise system? The answer is, "not completely." A
complex web of government regulations shape many aspects of business operations.
Every year, the government produces thousands of pages of new regulations, often
spelling out in painstaking detail exactly what businesses can and cannot do.
The American approach to government regulation is far from settled,
however. In recent years, regulations have grown tighter in some areas and been
relaxed in others. Indeed, one enduring theme of recent American economic
history has been a continuous debate about when, and how extensively, government
should intervene in business affairs.Laissez-faire Versus Government
Intervention
Historically, the U.S. government policy toward business was summed up by the
French term laissez-faire -- "leave it alone." The concept came from the
economic theories of Adam Smith, the 18th-century Scot whose writings greatly
influenced the growth of American capitalism. Smith believed that private
interests should have a free rein. As long as markets were free and competitive,
he said, the actions of private individuals, motivated by self-interest, would
work together for the greater good of society. Smith did favor some forms of
government intervention, mainly to establish the ground rules for free
enterprise. But it was his advocacy of laissez-faire practices that earned him
favor in America, a country built on faith in the individual and distrust of
authority.
Laissez-faire practices have not prevented private interests from turning
to the government for help on numerous occasions, however. Railroad companies
accepted grants of land and public subsidies in the 19th century. Industries
facing strong competition from abroad have long appealed for protections through
trade policy. American agriculture, almost totally in private hands, has
benefited from government assistance. Many other industries also have sought and
received aid ranging from tax breaks to outright subsidies from the government.
Government regulation of private industry can be divided into two
categories -- economic regulation and social regulation. Economic regulation
seeks, primarily, to control prices. Designed in theory to protect consumers and
certain companies (usually small businesses) from more powerful companies, it
often is justified on the grounds that fully competitive market conditions do
not exist and therefore cannot provide such protections themselves. In many
cases, however, economic regulations were developed to protect companies from
what they described as destructive competition with each other. Social
regulation, on the other hand, promotes objectives that are not economic -- such
as safer workplaces or a cleaner environment. Social regulations seek to
discourage or prohibit harmful corporate behavior or to encourage behavior
deemed socially desirable. The government controls smokestack emissions from
factories, for instance, and it provides tax breaks to companies that offer
their employees health and retirement benefits that meet certain standards.
American history has seen the pendulum swing repeatedly between
laissez-faire principles and demands for government regulation of both types.
For the last 25 years, liberals and conservatives alike have sought to reduce or
eliminate some categories of economic regulation, agreeing that the regulations
wrongly protected companies from competition at the expense of consumers.
Political leaders have had much sharper differences over social regulation,
however. Liberals have been much more likely to favor government intervention
that promotes a variety of non-economic objectives, while conservatives have
been more likely to see it as an intrusion that makes businesses less
competitive and less efficient.
Growth of Government Intervention
In the early days of the United States, government leaders largely refrained
from regulating business. As the 20th century approached, however, the
consolidation of U.S. industry into increasingly powerful corporations spurred
government intervention to protect small businesses and consumers. In 1890,
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act, a law designed to restore
competition and free enterprise by breaking up monopolies. In 1906, it passed
laws to ensure that food and drugs were correctly labeled and that meat was
inspected before being sold. In 1913, the government established a new federal
banking system, the Federal Reserve, to regulate the nation's money supply and
to place some controls on banking activities.
The largest changes in the government's role occurred during the "New
Deal," President Franklin D. Roosevelt's response to the Great Depression.
During this period in the 1930s, the United States endured the worst business
crisis and the highest rate of unemployment in its history. Many Americans
concluded that unfettered capitalism had failed. So they looked to government to
ease hardships and reduce what appeared to be self-destructive competition.
Roosevelt and the Congress enacted a host of new laws that gave government the
power to intervene in the economy. Among other things, these laws regulated
sales of stock, recognized the right of workers to form unions, set rules for
wages and hours, provided cash benefits to the unemployed and retirement income
for the elderly, established farm subsidies, insured bank deposits, and created
a massive regional development authority in the Tennessee Valley.
Many more laws and regulations have been enacted since the 1930s to protect
workers and consumers further. It is against the law for employers to
discriminate in hiring on the basis of age, sex, race, or religious belief.
Child labor generally is prohibited. Independent labor unions are guaranteed the
right to organize, bargain, and strike. The government issues and enforces
workplace safety and health codes. Nearly every product sold in the United
States is affected by some kind of government regulation: food manufacturers
must tell exactly what is in a can or box or jar; no drug can be sold until it
is thoroughly tested; automobiles must be built according to safety standards
and must meet pollution standards; prices for goods must be clearly marked; and
advertisers cannot mislead consumers.
By the early 1990s, Congress had created more than 100 federal regulatory
agencies in fields ranging from trade to communications, from nuclear energy to
product safety, and from medicines to employment opportunity. Among the newer
ones are the Federal Aviation Administration, which was established in 1966 and
enforces safety rules governing airlines, and the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHSTA), which was created in 1971 and oversees automobile
and driver safety. Both are part of the federal Department of Transportation.
Many regulatory agencies are structured so as to be insulated from the
president and, in theory, from political pressures. They are run by independent
boards whose members are appointed by the president and must be confirmed by the
Senate. By law, these boards must include commissioners from both political
parties who serve for fixed terms, usually of five to seven years. Each agency
has a staff, often more than 1,000 persons. Congress appropriates funds to the
agencies and oversees their operations. In some ways, regulatory agencies work
like courts. They hold hearings that resemble court trials, and their rulings
are subject to review by federal courts.
Despite the official independence of regulatory agencies, members of
Congress often seek to influence commissioners on behalf of their constituents.
Some critics charge that businesses at times have gained undue influence over
the agencies that regulate them; agency officials often acquire intimate
knowledge of the businesses they regulate, and many are offered high-paying jobs
in those industries once their tenure as regulators ends. Companies have their
own complaints, however. Among other things, some corporate critics complain
that government regulations dealing with business often become obsolete as soon
as they are written because business conditions change rapidly.
Federal Efforts to Control Monopoly
Monopolies were among the first business entities the U.S. government attempted
to regulate in the public interest. Consolidation of smaller companies into
bigger ones enabled some very large corporations to escape market discipline by
"fixing" prices or undercutting competitors. Reformers argued that these
practices ultimately saddled consumers with higher prices or restricted choices.
The Sherman Antitrust Act, passed in 1890, declared that no person or business
could monopolize trade or could combine or conspire with someone else to
restrict trade. In the early 1900s, the government used the act to break up John
D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company and several other large firms that it said
had abused their economic power.
In 1914, Congress passed two more laws designed to bolster the Sherman
Antitrust Act: the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The Clayton Antitrust Act defined more clearly what constituted illegal
restraint of trade. The act outlawed price discrimination that gave certain
buyers an advantage over others; forbade agreements in which manufacturers sell
only to dealers who agree not to sell a rival manufacturer's products; and
prohibited some types of mergers and other acts that could decrease competition.
The Federal Trade Commission Act established a government commission aimed at
preventing unfair and anti-competitive business practices.
Critics believed that even these new anti-monopoly tools were not fully
effective. In 1912, the United States Steel Corporation, which controlled more
than half of all the steel production in the United States, was accused of being
a monopoly. Legal action against the corporation dragged on until 1920 when, in
a landmark decision, the Supreme Court ruled that U.S. Steel was not a monopoly
because it did not engage in "unreasonable" restraint of trade. The court drew a
careful distinction between bigness and monopoly, and suggested that corporate
bigness is not necessarily bad.
The government has continued to pursue antitrust prosecutions since World
War II. The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department watch for potential monopolies or act to prevent mergers that
threaten to reduce competition so severely that consumers could suffer. Four
cases show the scope of these efforts:
- In 1945, in a case involving the Aluminum Company of America,
a federal appeals court considered how large a market share a firm could hold
before it should be scrutinized for monopolistic practices. The court settled
on 90 percent, noting "it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-five percent
would be enough, and certainly thirty-three percent is not."
- In 1961, a number of companies in the electrical equipment
industry were found guilty of fixing prices in restraint of competition. The
companies agreed to pay extensive damages to consumers, and some corporate
executives went to prison.
- In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a combination of
firms with large market shares could be presumed to be anti-competitive. The
case involved Philadelphia National Bank. The court ruled that if a merger
would cause a company to control an undue share of the market, and if there
was no evidence the merger would not be harmful, then the merger could not
take place.
- In 1997, a federal court concluded that even though retailing
is generally unconcentrated, certain retailers such as office supply
"superstores" compete in distinct economic markets. In those markets, merger
of two substantial firms would be anti-competitive, the court said. The case
involved a home office supply company, Staples, and a building supply company,
Home Depot. The planned merger was dropped.
As these examples demonstrate, it is not always easy to define when a
violation of antitrust laws occurs. Interpretations of the laws have varied, and
analysts often disagree in assessing whether companies have gained so much power
that they can interfere with the workings of the market. What's more, conditions
change, and corporate arrangements that appear to pose antitrust threats in one
era may appear less threatening in another. Concerns about the enormous power of
the Standard Oil monopoly in the early 1900s, for instance, led to the breakup
of Rockefeller's petroleum empire into numerous companies, including the
companies that became the Exxon and Mobil petroleum companies. But in the late
1990s, when Exxon and Mobil announced that they planned to merge, there was
hardly a whimper of public concern, although the government required some
concessions before approving the combination. Gas prices were low, and other,
powerful oil companies seemed strong enough to ensure competition.
Deregulating Transportation
While antitrust law may have been intended to increase competition, much other
regulation had the opposite effect. As Americans grew more concerned about
inflation in the 1970s, regulation that reduced price competition came under
renewed scrutiny. In a number of cases, government decided to ease controls in
cases where regulation shielded companies from market pressures.
Transportation was the first target of deregulation. Under President Jimmy
Carter (1977-1981), Congress enacted a series of laws that removed most of the
regulatory shields around aviation, trucking, and railroads. Companies were
allowed to compete by utilizing any air, road, or rail route they chose, while
more freely setting the rates for their services. In the process of
transportation deregulation, Congress eventually abolished two major economic
regulators: the 109-year-old Interstate Commerce Commission and the 45-year-old
Civil Aeronautics Board.
Although the exact impact of deregulation is difficult to assess, it
clearly created enormous upheaval in affected industries. Consider airlines.
After government controls were lifted, airline companies scrambled to find their
way in a new, far less certain environment. New competitors emerged, often
employing lower-wage nonunion pilots and workers and offering cheap, "no-frills"
services. Large companies, which had grown accustomed to government-set fares
that guaranteed they could cover all their costs, found themselves hard-pressed
to meet the competition. Some -- including Pan American World Airways, which to
many Americans was synonymous with the era of passenger airline travel, and
Eastern Airlines, which carried more passengers per year than any other American
airline -- failed. United Airlines, the nation's largest single airline, ran
into trouble and was rescued when its own workers agreed to buy it.
Customers also were affected. Many found the emergence of new companies and
new service options bewildering. Changes in fares also were confusing -- and not
always to the liking of some customers. Monopolies and regulated companies
generally set rates to ensure that they meet their overall revenue needs,
without worrying much about whether each individual service recovers enough
revenue to pay for itself. When airlines were regulated, rates for cross-country
and other long-distance routes, and for service to large metropolitan areas,
generally were set considerably higher than the actual cost of flying those
routes, while rates for costlier shorter-distance routes and for flights to
less-populated regions were set below the cost of providing the service. With
deregulation, such rate schemes fell apart, as small competitors realized they
could win business by concentrating on the more lucrative high-volume markets,
where rates were artificially high.
As established airlines cut fares to meet this challenge, they often
decided to cut back or even drop service to smaller, less-profitable markets.
Some of this service later was restored as new "commuter" airlines, often
divisions of larger carriers, sprang up. These smaller airlines may have offered
less frequent and less convenient service (using older propeller planes instead
of jets), but for the most part, markets that feared loss of airline service
altogether still had at least some service.
Most transportation companies initially opposed deregulation, but they
later came to accept, if not favor, it. For consumers, the record has been
mixed. Many of the low-cost airlines that emerged in the early days of
deregulation have disappeared, and a wave of mergers among other airlines may
have decreased competition in certain markets. Nevertheless, analysts generally
agree that air fares are lower than they would have been had regulation
continued. And airline travel is booming. In 1978, the year airline deregulation
began, passengers flew a total of 226,800 million miles (362,800 million
kilometers) on U.S. airlines. By 1997, that figure had nearly tripled, to
605,400 million passenger miles (968,640 kilometers).
Telecommunications
Until the 1980s in the United States, the term "telephone company" was
synonymous with American Telephone & Telegraph. AT&T controlled nearly all
aspects of the telephone business. Its regional subsidiaries, known as "Baby
Bells," were regulated monopolies, holding exclusive rights to operate in
specific areas. The Federal Communications Commission regulated rates on
long-distance calls between states, while state regulators had to approve rates
for local and in-state long-distance calls.
Government regulation was justified on the theory that telephone companies,
like electric utilities, were natural monopolies. Competition, which was assumed
to require stringing multiple wires across the countryside, was seen as wasteful
and inefficient. That thinking changed beginning around the 1970s, as sweeping
technological developments promised rapid advances in telecommunications.
Independent companies asserted that they could, indeed, compete with AT&T. But
they said the telephone monopoly effectively shut them out by refusing to allow
them to interconnect with its massive network.
Telecommunications deregulation came in two sweeping stages. In 1984, a
court effectively ended AT&T's telephone monopoly, forcing the giant to spin off
its regional subsidiaries. AT&T continued to hold a substantial share of the
long-distance telephone business, but vigorous competitors such as MCI
Communications and Sprint Communications won some of the business, showing in
the process that competition could bring lower prices and improved service.
A decade later, pressure grew to break up the Baby Bells' monopoly over
local telephone service. New technologies -- including cable television,
cellular (or wireless) service, the Internet, and possibly others -- offered
alternatives to local telephone companies. But economists said the enormous
power of the regional monopolies inhibited the development of these
alternatives. In particular, they said, competitors would have no chance of
surviving unless they could connect, at least temporarily, to the established
companies' networks -- something the Baby Bells resisted in numerous ways.
In 1996, Congress responded by passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
The law allowed long-distance telephone companies such as AT&T, as well as cable
television and other start-up companies, to begin entering the local telephone
business. It said the regional monopolies had to allow new competitors to link
with their networks. To encourage the regional firms to welcome competition, the
law said they could enter the long-distance business once new competition was
established in their domains.
At the end of the 1990s, it was still too early to assess the impact of the
new law. There were some positive signs. Numerous smaller companies had begun
offering local telephone service, especially in urban areas where they could
reach large numbers of customers at low cost. The number of cellular telephone
subscribers soared. Countless Internet service providers sprung up to link
households to the Internet. But there also were developments that Congress had
not anticipated or intended. A great number of telephone companies merged, and
the Baby Bells mounted numerous barriers to thwart competition. The regional
firms, accordingly, were slow to expand into long-distance service. Meanwhile,
for some consumers -- especially residential telephone users and people in rural
areas whose service previously had been subsidized by business and urban
customers -- deregulation was bringing higher, not lower, prices.
The Special Case of Banking
Banks are a special case when it comes to regulation. On one hand, they are
private businesses just like toy manufacturers and steel companies. But they
also play a central role in the economy and therefore affect the well-being of
everybody, not just their own consumers. Since the 1930s, Americans have devised
regulations designed to recognize the unique position banks hold.
One of the most important of these regulations is deposit insurance. During
the Great Depression, America's economic decline was seriously aggravated when
vast numbers of depositors, concerned that the banks where they had deposited
their savings would fail, sought to withdraw their funds all at the same time.
In the resulting "runs" on banks, depositors often lined up on the streets in a
panicky attempt to get their money. Many banks, including ones that were
operated prudently, collapsed because they could not convert all their assets to
cash quickly enough to satisfy depositors. As a result, the supply of funds
banks could lend to business and industrial enterprise shrank, contributing to
the economy's decline.
Deposit insurance was designed to prevent such runs on banks. The
government said it would stand behind deposits up to a certain level -- $100,000
currently. Now, if a bank appears to be in financial trouble, depositors no
longer have to worry. The government's bank-insurance agency, known as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, pays off the depositors, using funds
collected as insurance premiums from the banks themselves. If necessary, the
government also will use general tax revenues to protect depositors from losses.
To protect the government from undue financial risk, regulators supervise banks
and order corrective action if the banks are found to be taking undue risks.
The New Deal of the 1930s era also gave rise to rules preventing banks from
engaging in the securities and insurance businesses. Prior to the Depression,
many banks ran into trouble because they took excessive risks in the stock
market or provided loans to industrial companies in which bank directors or
officers had personal investments. Determined to prevent that from happening
again, Depression-era politicians enacted the Glass-Steagall Act, which
prohibited the mixing of banking, securities, and insurance businesses. Such
regulation grew controversial in the 1970s, however, as banks complained that
they would lose customers to other financial companies unless they could offer a
wider variety of financial services.
The government responded by giving banks greater freedom to offer consumers
new types of financial services. Then, in late 1999, Congress enacted the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall
Act. The new law went beyond the considerable freedom that banks already were
enjoying to offer everything from consumer banking to underwriting securities.
It allowed banks, securities, and insurance firms to form financial
conglomerates that could market a range of financial products including mutual
funds, stocks and bonds, insurance, and automobile loans. As with laws
deregulating transportation, telecommunications, and other industries, the new
law was expected to generate a wave of mergers among financial institutions.
Generally, the New Deal legislation was successful, and the American
banking system returned to health in the years following World War II. But it
ran into difficulties again in the 1980s and 1990s -- in part because of social
regulation. After the war, the government had been eager to foster home
ownership, so it helped create a new banking sector -- the "savings and loan"
(S&L) industry -- to concentrate on making long-term home loans, known as
mortgages. Savings and loans faced one major problem: mortgages typically ran
for 30 years and carried fixed interest rates, while most deposits have much
shorter terms. When short-term interest rates rise above the rate on long-term
mortgages, savings and loans can lose money. To protect savings and loan
associations and banks against this eventuality, regulators decided to control
interest rates on deposits.
For a while, the system worked well. In the 1960s and 1970s, almost all
Americans got S&L financing for buying their homes. Interest rates paid on
deposits at S&Ls were kept low, but millions of Americans put their money in
them because deposit insurance made them an extremely safe place to invest.
Starting in the 1960s, however, general interest rate levels began rising with
inflation. By the 1980s, many depositors started seeking higher returns by
putting their savings into money market funds and other non-bank assets. This
put banks and savings and loans in a dire financial squeeze, unable to attract
new deposits to cover their large portfolios of long-term loans.
Responding to their problems, the government in the 1980s began a gradual
phasing out of interest rate ceilings on bank and S&L deposits. But while this
helped the institutions attract deposits again, it produced large and widespread
losses on S&Ls' mortgage portfolios, which were for the most part earning lower
interest rates than S&Ls now were paying depositors. Again responding to
complaints, Congress relaxed restrictions on lending so that S&Ls could make
higher-earning investments. In particular, Congress allowed S&Ls to engage in
consumer, business, and commercial real estate lending. They also liberalized
some regulatory procedures governing how much capital S&Ls would have to hold.
Fearful of becoming obsolete, S&Ls expanded into highly risky activities
such as speculative real estate ventures. In many cases, these ventures proved
to be unprofitable, especially when economic conditions turned unfavorable.
Indeed, some S&Ls were taken over by unsavory people who plundered them. Many
S&Ls ran up huge losses. Government was slow to detect the unfolding crisis
because budgetary stringency and political pressures combined to shrink
regulators' staffs.
The S&L crisis in a few years mushroomed into the biggest national
financial scandal in American history. By the end of the decade, large numbers
of S&Ls had tumbled into insolvency; about half of the S&Ls that had been in
business in 1970 no longer existed in 1989. The Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, which insured depositors' money, itself became insolvent.
In 1989, Congress and the president agreed on a taxpayer-financed bailout
measure known as the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act (FIRREA). This act provided $50 billion to close failed S&Ls, totally
changed the regulatory apparatus for savings institutions, and imposed new
portfolio constraints. A new government agency called the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) was set up to liquidate insolvent institutions. In March 1990,
another $78,000 million was pumped into the RTC. But estimates of the total cost
of the S&L cleanup continued to mount, topping the $200,000 million mark.
Americans have taken a number of lessons away from the post-war experience
with banking regulation. First, government deposit insurance protects small
savers and helps maintain the stability of the banking system by reducing the
danger of runs on banks. Second, interest rate controls do not work. Third,
government should not direct what investments banks should make; rather,
investments should be determined on the basis of market forces and economic
merit. Fourth, bank lending to insiders or to companies affiliated with insiders
should be closely watched and limited. Fifth, when banks do become insolvent,
they should be closed as quickly as possible, their depositors paid off, and
their loans transferred to other, healthier lenders. Keeping insolvent
institutions in operation merely freezes lending and can stifle economic
activity.
Finally, while banks generally should be allowed to fail when they become
insolvent, Americans believe that the government has a continuing responsibility
to supervise them and prevent them from engaging in unnecessarily risky lending
that could damage the entire economy. In addition to direct supervision,
regulators increasingly emphasize the importance of requiring banks to raise a
substantial amount of their own capital. Besides giving banks funds that can be
used to absorb losses, capital requirements encourage bank owners to operate
responsibly since they will lose these funds in the event their banks fail.
Regulators also stress the importance of requiring banks to disclose their
financial status; banks are likely to behave more responsibly if their
activities and conditions are publicly known.
Protecting the Environment
The regulation of practices that affect the environment has been a relatively
recent development in the United States, but it is a good example of government
intervention in the economy for a social purpose.
Beginning in the 1960s, Americans became increasingly concerned about the
environmental impact of industrial growth. Engine exhaust from growing numbers
of automobiles, for instance, was blamed for smog and other forms of air
pollution in larger cities. Pollution represented what economists call an
externality -- a cost the responsible entity can escape but that society as a
whole must bear. With market forces unable to address such problems, many
environmentalists suggested that government has a moral obligation to protect
the earth's fragile ecosystems -- even if doing so requires that some economic
growth be sacrificed. A slew of laws were enacted to control pollution,
including the 1963 Clean Air Act, the 1972 Clean Water Act, and the 1974 Safe
Drinking Water Act.
Environmentalists achieved a major goal in December 1970 with the
establishment of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which brought
together in a single agency many federal programs charged with protecting the
environment. The EPA sets and enforces tolerable limits of pollution, and it
establishes timetables to bring polluters into line with standards; since most
of the requirements are of recent origin, industries are given reasonable time,
often several years, to conform to standards. The EPA also has the authority to
coordinate and support research and anti-pollution efforts of state and local
governments, private and public groups, and educational institutions. Regional
EPA offices develop, propose, and implement approved regional programs for
comprehensive environmental protection activities.
Data collected since the agency began its work show significant
improvements in environmental quality; there has been a nationwide decline of
virtually all air pollutants, for example. However, in 1990 many Americans
believed that still greater efforts to combat air pollution were needed.
Congress passed important amendments to the Clean Air Act, and they were signed
into law by President George Bush (1989-1993). Among other things, the
legislation incorporated an innovative market-based system designed to secure a
substantial reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions, which produce what is known
as acid rain. This type of pollution is believed to cause serious damage to
forests and lakes, particularly in the eastern part of the United States and
Canada.
What's Next?
The liberal-conservative split over social regulation is probably deepest in the
areas of environmental and workplace health and safety regulation, though it
extends to other kinds of regulation as well. The government pursued social
regulation with great vigor in the 1970s, but Republican President Ronald Reagan
(1981-1989) sought to curb those controls in the 1980s, with some success.
Regulation by agencies such as National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) slowed down
considerably for several years, marked by episodes such as a dispute over
whether NHTSA should proceed with a federal standard that, in effect, required
auto-makers to install air bags (safety devices that inflate to protect
occupants in many crashes) in new cars. Eventually, the devices were required.
Social regulation began to gain new momentum after the Democratic Clinton
administration took over in 1992. But the Republican Party, which took control
of Congress in 1994 for the first time in 40 years, again placed social
regulators squarely on the defensive. That produced a new regulatory
cautiousness at agencies like OSHA.
The EPA in the 1990s, under considerable legislative pressure, turned
toward cajoling business to protect the environment rather than taking a tough
regulatory approach. The agency pressed auto-makers and electric utilities to
reduce small particles of soot that their operations spewed into the air, and it
worked to control water-polluting storm and farm-fertilizer runoffs. Meanwhile,
environmentally minded Al Gore, the vice president during President Clinton's
two terms, buttressed EPA policies by pushing for reduced air pollution to curb
global warming, a super-efficient car that would emit fewer air pollutants, and
incentives for workers to use mass transit.
The government, meanwhile, has tried to use price mechanisms to achieve
regulatory goals, hoping this would be less disruptive to market forces. It
developed a system of air-pollution credits, for example, which allowed
companies to sell the credits among themselves. Companies able to meet pollution
requirements least expensively could sell credits to other companies. This way,
officials hoped, overall pollution-control goals could be achieved in the most
efficient way.
Economic deregulation maintained some appeal through the close of the
1990s. Many states moved to end regulatory controls on electric utilities, which
proved a very complicated issue because service areas were fragmented. Adding
another layer of complexity were the mix of public and private utilities, and
massive capital costs incurred during the construction of electric-generating
facilities.
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